Emergence of product differentiation from consumer heterogeneity and
  asymmetric information by Lü, Linyuan et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
4.
12
29
v2
  [
q-
fin
.T
R]
  2
7 J
un
 20
08
Emergence of product differentiation from consumer
heterogeneity and asymmetric information
Linyuan Lu¨1,2, Matu´sˇ Medo3, Yi-Cheng Zhang2,3, Damien Challet3,4
1 Department of Systems Science, School of Management, Beijing Normal University,
100875 Beijing, China
2 Lab of Information Economy and Internet Research, University of Electronic Science
and Technology of China, 610054 Chengdu, China
3 Physics Department, University of Fribourg, Pe´rolles, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
4 Institute for Scientific Interchange, via S. Severo 65, 10113 Turin, Italy
Abstract
We introduce a fully probabilistic framework of consumer product choice based on
quality assessment. It allows us to capture many aspects of marketing such as partial
information asymmetry, quality differentiation, and product placement in a supermarket.
1 Introduction
The interests of vendors and customers seem antagonistic a priori, the former aiming at de-
creasing quality and increasing price, whereas the latter wishing exactly the opposite. The
situation is fortunately more complex, the interests of both sides being sometimes compati-
ble. Intuitively, a vendor may sell more items by increasing their perceivable quality, making
everybody happier. But the situation is more subtle because of asymmetric information: the
vendor knows much better than his prospective customers the real quality of his products. In
Akerlof’s famous Lemon Problem, the customers have no means to assertain the quality of
products, which leads to a no-trade paradox [1]. When the customers are better equipped,
optimal quality emerges [2, 3, 4]. One of the main issues is to understand under which con-
ditions a manufacturer should diversify his production. Economics literature has approached
this problem mainly with the help of utility functions. Several aspects have been studied,
among them optimal quality-based product differentiation [5], firm competition by quality [6]
and by price [7], the relation between product quality and market size [8], etc. (see [9, 10] for
a review).
We assume that customers’ decisions, while influenced by perceived properties of the
products, are probabilistic in nature. Using a probabilistic consumer choice framework makes
it possible to avoid utility functions and hence our model can be understood as an alternative
to the usual utility-function approach. For other alternatives, known as models of discrete or
probabilistic choice, which still use utility theory and yet they are probabilistic see [11, 12, 13].
In our work we take the point of view of a monopolistic vendor faced to consumers deciding
to buy one of his products according to their perception of its quality. The resulting complex
complex system with one vendor, several product variants, and many heterogeneous buyers,
is investigated by numerical techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce our framework and determine
the optimal quality of a single product proposed to homogeneous or heterogeneous customers.
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Q
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
PA (Q ,α )
α = 0.1
α = 1
α = 10
Figure 1: The acceptance probability PA(Q,α) for various values of the acceptance parameter
α.
In section 3 we examine the conditions under which a vendor should segment the market by
manufacturing several products of different quality. In section 4 we allow the vendor to
optimize the price as well. We leave to the appendices a deeper discussion of our assumptions
and more technical results on the economics of spamming.
2 Single product
We assume that the only difference between products lies in their quality Q ≥ 0 which is
therefore the main quantity of interest here.1 With a suitable choice of units, one can write
the profit of a vendor per item sold as 1 − F (Q) where F is an increasing function and
F (1) = 1. For the sake of simplicity, we take F (Q) = Q; F (Q) ∝ Q2 is also found in the
literature but does not alter qualitatively our results. While Q could in principle be greater
than one, a vendor would never choose it, hence our analysis is restricted to Q ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that a customer buys a product of quality Q with acceptance probability
PA(Q). While there are many possible choices, e.g. those of Refs. [9, 15] or piece-wise linear
functions as in Ref. [4], we shall mainly use
PA(Q,α) =
(
1− 1α+1
)
Qα (α ≥ 0) (1)
where α > 0 is the acceptance parameter: for small α, PA is mostly flat, resulting in a lack
of quality discrimination; as α grows, the core of PA shifts towards higher quality, which
reflects enhanced discrimination abilities (see Fig. 1). We will use the shorthands “ignorant”
for buyers with a small α and “informed” for those with a large α; an ignorant buyer is quite
likely to reject even a perfect product. Since for α > 0 and Q ∈ [0; 1] is PA(Q,α) < 1, by
Eq. (1) we implicitly assume that for the considered product there are substitutes which can
satisfy needs of consumers.
If there are N buyers with acceptance parameters αi (i = 1, . . . , N), faced with a single
product of quality Q, the vendor’s expected profit X is
X(Q) = (1−Q)
N∑
i=1
PA(Q,αi)− Z. (2)
1One can also build a model starting from the tastes of the buyers as in [14].
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Figure 2: Optimal vendor’s profit per buyer x∗ as a function of α for z = 0.05.
where Z represents the fixed part of production costs due, for instance, to the initial invest-
ment needed to setup the manufacturing plant. Assuming that N is large, the fluctuations of
X can be neglected. The structure of this expression is similar to the profit function intro-
duced in [9]. Since X ′(0) > 0, X ′(1) < 0, and X(Q) is a continuous function, there is at least
one Q maximizing X in (0, 1).
In the following we take the point of view of the vendor and hence optimize his expected
profit X.
2.1 Homogeneous population
When there is only one type of buyers, the expected profit simplifies to X(Q) = N(1 −
Q)PA(Q,α)− Z which reaches its maximum at
Q∗(α) =
α
α+ 1
. (3)
Expectedly, Q∗(α) increases when the buyers have a sharper eye. The total optimal profit
reads
X∗(α) = N
αα+1
(α + 1)α+2
− Z. (4)
In Fig. 2 we report the expected optimal profit per customer x∗(α) := X∗(α)/N as a function
of α for z := Z/N = 0.05. When z > 0, a vendor only makes a profit when the quality is
not too high or too low. Accordingly x∗(α) has a maximum at α0 ≈ 0.65. Therefore, if the
vendor cannot easily change Q, he should target a population with Q∗, or strive to modify the
abilities of his prospective customers to detect quality, thereby increasing his profit. When
0 ≤ α < α0), both the consumers and the vendor benefit from an increase in Q; we shall
call it the cooperative region. Reversely, when α > α0 the vendor suffers from excessive
quality detection abilities of his customers; he could try a confusing marketing campain or
rebranding so as to lower their abilities—this is the defensive region. A similar behaviour has
been observed in [16]. In our case, the fact that the cooperative region is much smaller than
the defensive region is a consequence of the shape of PA. For instance, when the prefactor
in PA(Q) changes from 1 − (α + 1)
−1 to 1 − (α + 1)−1/3, the size of the cooperative region
increases significantly.
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Figure 3: Optimal product quality Q∗ (left) and vendor’s optimal profit x∗ (right) versus
proportion c2 for various values of α2; α1 = 0.1, z = 0.01.
2.2 Heterogeneous buyers
Heterogeneity brings in more surprises. Let us split the population into two groups, group
i = 1, 2 consisting of Ni buyers with acceptance parameter αi; the proportion of group i is
denoted by ci := Ni/N . The vendor’s expected profit reads
X(Q) = N(1−Q)
[
c1PA(Q,α1) + c2PA(Q,α2)
]
− Z. (5)
It is not possible to maximizeX analytically. The result of numerical investigations is shown in
Fig. 3 as a function of c2 for α1 = 0.1 (ignorant buyers) and various choices of α2. As expected,
as the proportion of informed buyers increases, Q∗ grows. But a surprising behaviour is found
for instance when α2 = 3: at c2 ≈ 0.32 the optimal quality changes discontinuously. This is
because X(Q) has two local maxima. While for small c2 the small-Q peak yields the largest
profit, its relative height decreases as c2 increases; accordingly the discontinuous transition
occurs when the heights of the two maxima are equal. In Fig. 3 we also show the dependence
of the optimal profit per buyer x∗ on c2. When group 2 has α2 < α0 (e.g., α2 = 0.5), adding
people with more demands regarding quality is beneficial to the vendor (Eq. (4)) and X is
an increasing function of c2. By contrast, when α2 > α0 the optimal profit first decreases as
almost nobody of group 2 will buy anything and does so as long as group 2 has less influence
on Q∗ than group 1. Then group 2 supercedes group 1 and imposes its quality demands; the
discussion generalises to an arbitrary number of groups. In other words, when society is too
heterogeneous, it is impossible to satisfy all buyer groups with one product.
3 Multiple products
Now we assume that the vendor displays M product variants of different quality, at equal
prices for the sake of simplicity, and that each buyer buys at most one item. A purchase is a
two-step process, as a shopper has also to decide on a variant. The choice is also assumed to
be probabilistic: variant m = 1, . . . ,M is chosen according to
PS(m|Q, σ) =
Qσm∑M
m′=1Q
σ
m′
. (6)
Here σ ∈ [0,∞) quantifies the selection ability of a given buyer. When σ is large, the buyer
almost surely selects the best variant; on the contrary when σ = 0, PS(m) = 1/M for all
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Figure 4: Optimal profit per buyer x∗ as a function of quality Q: one product, two groups
of buyers (α1 = 0.1, α2 = 3.0). As c2 increases, at c2 ≈ 0.32 the heights of the maxima are
equal and a discontinuous change of the optimal quality occurs.
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Figure 5: The probability to select variant 1 as a function of its quality Q1 for various values
of the selection parameter σ. In total three variants are displayed, the qualities Q2 = 0.5 and
Q3 = 0.2 are fixed.
m, i.e., the buyer has no discerning power. Since PS is normalized, each buyer purchases at
most one item. Similar expressions appear in works on the influence of advertisement [15] and
non-price competition [9], but other choices of functions would also be reasonable, such as
exponentials as in the Logit model [13, 17]. All Qσm′ have equal weight in Eq. (6); section 3.3
generalizes this expression in order to take into account the proportions of displayed items.
Finally, a more complete discussion on the plausibility of PS is given in Appendix A.
To summarize, the variant m with the quality Qm is bought by buyer i with probability
PS(m|σi,Q)PA(Qm, αi). As a consequence, if the vendor displays M variants to N buyers,
his expected profit is
X(Q) =
M∑
m=1
(1−Qm)
( N∑
i=1
PS(m|Q, σi)PA(Qm, αi)
)
−MZ. (7)
This equation can be easily extended to account for special circumstances. For example, when
Z is large, it may be profitable to produce one variant and achieve quality differentiation by
artificially damaging a fraction of the production, e.g. by disabling some features [18]. In this
case two variants with qualities Q1 > Q2 are displayed but the profit per item sold is only
1−Q1 for both of them and the initial cost is reduced from 2Z to Z.
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Figure 6: a) Optimal profits per buyer as a function of proportion c2; two-variant profits x
∗
2
(broken and dashdot lines) are shown only when quality differentiation occurs. b) Optimal
quality as a function of proportion c2, curves for the differentiated qualities Q
∗
1 and Q
∗
2 are
only shown when x∗2 > x
∗
1. Values of parameters are α1 = 0.2, α2 = 3.0, σ1 = 0.5, and
σ2 = 3.0.
3.1 Quality differentiation
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two groups of customers consisting of Ni members with
acceptance parameter αi and selection power σi (i = 1, 2). The question is whether the vendor
should display one or two products. In our framework, the answer is entirely determined by
the respective optimal profit of each possibility, denoted by X∗1 (Q) and X
∗
2 (Q1, Q2).
Since manufacturing two products requires twice as much initial investment (by hypoth-
esis), the region in which X∗2 > X
∗
1 shrinks when z increases. This appears clearly in Fig. 6
where we plot the optimal profits versus c2 = N2/N for two values of z. In addition, when
X∗2 > X
∗
1 , the two optimal qualities Q
∗
1 and Q
∗
2 differ significantly. Quite clearly, the lower
quality targets the group of ignorant buyers while the higher quality is for informed buyers.
Remarkably, when c2 > 0.68, the lower optimal quality is even smaller than the optimal
quality α1/(α1+1) = 1/6 corresponding to a homogeneous population of ignorant customers.
This downward distortion in a situation of a monopolistic vendor is also reported in [19]; it
is optimal as it reduces the substitution possibilities of higher-value (or numerous enough)
customers. The benefits of low quality variants in market competition are discussed in detail
in [6].
3.2 How many variants?
The phase space (c2, z) of optimal production when at most two variants are allowed is
reported in Fig. 7a. At intermediate values of c2, product differentiation exists if z is small
enough (see also [14]). Can a further decrease of z differentiate further the production?
Figure 7b reveals the Russian-dolls structure of product differentiation. Let us consider the
caseM = 3: whenX∗3 > X
∗
2 , in fact only two products are really different, i.e. Q
∗
1 = Q
∗
2 < Q
∗
3.
In other words, it pays to duplicate the low quality variant. This is because it decreases the
likelihood that an ignorant buyer selects the high quality variant, while informed buyers,
thanks to their high selection parameter, are still able to pick the premium variant. This
mechanism is at work for a generic M : when z is small, for the vendor it may be optimal to
display M − 1 low-quality variants with identical qualities and one premium variant.
Finally we consider the vendor’s expected profit for various numbers of displayed variants.
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Figure 7: Phase space (c2, z) of optimal production: only 0, 1, 2 variants are allowed (a) and
without constraints on the maximal number of variants (b). Same parameters as in Fig. 6.
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Figure 8: Optimal profit for M displayed variants when z = 0.002 (a) and when z = 0 (b).
Same parameters as in Fig. 6.
As can be seen in Fig. 8a, when z = 0.002, the additional gain decreases very fast when M
increases and vanishes when M > 4. By contrast, when z = 0, X∗ saturates at the much
higher M = 40 and then decreases.
3.3 Biased selection
In Eq. (6) we implicitly assume equal standing of the available variants, which is often not the
case in practice. This suggests to introduce variant weights rm (
∑M
m=1 rm = 1) in the selection
probability PS , taking into account for instance the effective visibility of each product due to
advertisement or display position in shops. Eq. (6) generalizes to
P ′S(m|Q, r, σ) =
rmQ
σ
m∑M
m′=1 rm′Q
σ
m′
. (8)
An example of the interplay between rm and σ is shown in Fig. 9: better equipped customers
are able to pick the better product even when its effective proportion is small.
To study the effects of the proposed generalization we use once again two groups of
customers and choose the parameters so as to set the system in the quality differentiation
region. Results of numerical optimization of the optimal profit are reported in Fig. 10, r2
denotes the proportion of the premium variant. Differentiation occurs in a limited range of
r2: when r2 is either too small or too large, buyers effectively notice only one variant and
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Figure 9: a) The probability to select variant 2 in the presence of two variants with similar
qualities (Q1 = 0.5, Q2 = 0.7) for various σ. b) When qualities are differentiated, informed
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Figure 10: Optimal qualities (a) and the optimal profit (b) versus proportion of the premium
variant r2 (α1 = 0.2, α2 = 3, σ1 = 0.2, σ2 = 2, z = 0.01, c2 = 0.5, M = 2).
it is preferable for the vendor to produce only that one. In addition, x∗ has a maximum at
r2 ≈ 0.08, which comes from hiding the high quality variant to ignorant buyers while keeping
it accessible to informed buyers.
4 Price
Let us now consider the price as a free parameter and investigate how the vendor should
fix it optimally. Denoting the price by p, the profit per item is p − Q which means that
the maximum quality is Qmax = p. In particular, if the vendor wishes to produce a better
product that Qmax, the price needs to be increased. The acceptance probability generalizes
to (α ≥ 0, p ∈ [Q,α+ 1])
PA(Q, p, α) =
(
1−
p
α+ 1
)(
Q
p
)α
. (9)
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Figure 11: Optimal profit x∗ vs acceptance parameter α: fixed price (solid line, the same
curve as in Fig. 2) and variable price (dashed line), z = 0.
It satisfies two constraints: first, the higher the price, the smaller the acceptance probability.
Second, because of the p/(α+ 1) term, the sensitivity towards prices decreases as sensitivity
to quality increases; similarly, quality must be judged with respect to price, hence the (Q/p)α
term. The discussion of the previous sections corresponds to p = 1.
We restrict our analysis to the simplest case of N identical buyers and one product. The
expected profit reads
X1(Q, p) = N(p−Q)
(
1−
p
α+ 1
)(
Q
p
)α
with p ≤ α+ 1 and Q ∈ [0, p], it is maximized by
Q∗ =
α
2
, p∗ =
α+ 1
2
. (10)
Expectedly, the more informed the buyers, the better the products should be, but the vendor
can charge a higher price. Because p∗ − Q∗ = 1/2 is a constant, there is no incentive in
this model for exceptionally high prices for high quality variants. In Fig. 11, the resulting
optimal profit per buyer x∗ is shown together with the optimal profit when the vendor has
fixed the price at 1. The liberty to set the price can increase the profit of the vendor quite
considerably. The difference of profit for α > 1 (informed buyers) is due to the fact that
the vendor is allowed to charge a higher price for the high quality demanded by the buyers.
By contrast, for α < 1 the main improvement comes from the fact that PA(Q, p, α) does not
vanish when Q→ 0 and p < 1.
5 Conclusion
Due to the complexity of markets and human behaviour, attempts to propose a theory of
the whole are illusory. However, simple models can bring insight to elementary mechanisms
at work in the real economy. Assuming probabilistic buyer behaviour, we formalized buyers’
abilities, spanning from the zero information to the perfect information limits. Adopting the
vendor’s point of view, we examined the compromise between low quality which minimizes
production costs and high quality which maximizes sales. In particular, the fact that cus-
tomers are heterogeneous forces vendors to diversify their production. In other words, the
large variety of products in free-market economies reflects in part the information gathering
and processing abilities of customers.
9
In this work we focused on the basic market phenomena but the proposed model is versatile
enough to represent more complicated cases. Three important extensions seem particularly
worth further investigation: including explicitely the price in heterogeneous populations,
generalizing the present results to an arbitrary number of consumer groups, and adding more
vendors and letting them to compete for customers (then it can be Nash stable that variants
with different qualities are provided by different vendors).
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A Discussion of the model plausibility
In order to better understand the need for both selection and acceptance procedures, it is
worthwhile to consider some alternatives. One possibility to simplify our assumptions is to
keep only the acceptance process with each displayed variant accepted or not according to the
acceptance probability PA. When M variants with the qualities Q1, . . . , QM are displayed,
the probability P ′ that a given customer accepts at least one of them is
P ′(Q1, . . . , QM ) = 1−
M∏
a=1
[
1− PA(Qa)
]
. (11)
As M increases, P ′ converges to one. This means that the vendor can attract the buyers by
displaying a large number of very bad products which is generally not the case. However,
flooding of customers by low quality occurs under some special circumstances. This economics
of spamming is briefly discussed in the next Appendix.
Another approach is to reduce the model to the best product selection governed by the
selection probability PS . Since this probability is normalized to one, when it is applied alone,
each buyer surely buys one of the displayed variants and consequently the vendor’s profit
maximization yields zero quality. Obviously, such an optimal solution is pathological. One
could eventually consider replacing the unity in the equation
∑M
m=1 PS(m|Q, σ) = 1 by an
increasing function of the displayed qualities but this is effectively equivalent to our two step
decision process. Another possibility is to introduce an artificial non-purchase alternative to
Eq. (6) with an imposed utility as in [13] which focuses on price differentiation. We see that
nor the selection from the available variants is sufficient to model the purchase process.
Finally, the generalization to diverse proportions of displayed variants, introduced in sec-
tion 3.3, gives an additional argument. We see that while in the selection step both quality
and proportion play their roles, in the final acceptance step it is only quality of the selected
variant what matters. Thus these two steps are intrinsically different and attempts to merge
them are artificial.
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Figure 12: Optimal quality (a) and optimal vendor profit per buyer (b) versus acceptance
parameter α.
B Economics of spamming
By the economics of spamming we understand the situation when a low initial cost Z allows
the vendor to produce an abundance of low quality variants. We simplify our considerations
to M variants with identical qualities Q and identical buyers with acceptance parameter α.
Assuming that the variants are displayed consecutively, the selection probability plays no
role. This situation resembles spam messages arriving into our mailboxes which we reject one
by one. According to Eq. (11), on average N(1 − [1 − PA(Q,α)]
M ) buyers accept one of the
displayed variants and the expected vendor profit per buyer is therefore
x(Q,M) = (1−Q)
(
1−
[
1− PA(Q,α)
]M)
−Mz. (12)
Since we focus on low quality variants, PA(Q,α) is small and the approximation 1 − x ≈
exp[−x] can be used. It follows that for a given quality Q, the optimal number of displayed
variants is
M∗(Q) =
α+ 1
αQα
ln
α(1−Q)Qα
z(α+ 1)
. (13)
However, when buyers’ perception is limited to a certain number of variants Mm, this value
applies instead of M∗(Q). Assuming small initial cost z, the leading contribution to the
optimal quality can be shown to verify b ln[αQα/b] = Qα+1, where b := z(1 + 1/α)). When
the resulting Q∗ ≪ 1, it follows that Eq. (13) take the simple form M∗(Q∗) = Q∗/(αz);
the optimal quality Q∗ has to be found numerically. The results are shown in Fig. 12: as z
gets lower, the optimal quality decreases and the optimal profit increases; in addition, when
acceptance parameters are small (10−2 . α . 1) the optimal profit per buyer is almost one
which means that nearly all buyers react to the spamming.
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